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Abstract
To achieve the twin objectives of incentivizing agent performance and providing information
for planning purposes, public sector organizations often rely on reports by local monitors that
are costly to verify. Received wisdom has it that attaching financial incentives to these reports
will result in collusion, and undermine both objectives. Simple bargaining logic, however, sug-
gests the reverse: pay for locally monitored performance could incentivize desired behavior and
improve information. To investigate this issue, we conducted a randomized controlled trial in
Ugandan primary schools that explored how incentives for teachers could be designed when
based on local monitoring by head teachers. Our experiment randomly varied whether head
teachers’ reports of teacher attendance were tied to teacher bonus payments or not. We find
that local monitoring on its own is ineffective at improving teacher attendance. However, com-
bining local monitoring with financial incentives leads to both an increase in teacher attendance
(by 8 percentage points) and an improvement in the quality of information. We also observe
substantial gains in pupil attainment, driven primarily by a reduction in dropouts. By plac-
ing a financial value on these enrollment gains, we demonstrate that pay for locally monitored
performance passes both welfare and fiscal sustainability tests.
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1 Introduction
Public sector organizations around the world rely on reports by local monitors that are costly to
verify. Typically, these reports serve two objectives: to incentivize desired behavior, and to provide
information for planning purposes. To these ends, in many education systems head teachers submit
pupil enrollment and attendance figures, and schools (sometimes even pupils) receive financial
transfers based on these reports. In health systems, it is common for hospital administrators to
submit performance indicators, such as the number of patient visits or hospital waiting times, and
for healthcare professionals to be rewarded based on these reports. Governments use such reports
not only to incentivize agents but also to make policy decisions in aggregate, for example relating to
facility construction, human resource transfers, the taxation of unhealthy habits, and public health
campaigns.
When stakes (whether pecuniary or reputational) are attached to these reports, there is a
clear risk of misreporting. Across 21 countries in Africa, head teacher over-reporting of pupil
enrollment figures increased dramatically when countries introduced school funding on a per-pupil
basis (Sandefur & Glassman 2015). Veterans Affairs hospitals in the US kept patients off official
waiting lists in order to meet targeted 14-day waiting times for appointments (VA Office of Inspector
General 2014). These distortions not only weaken incentives for providers, but also undermine
governments’ ability to plan and allocate resources effectively.
Administrative monitoring alone does not resolve these conflicts of interest. In Kenya, head
teachers were asked to monitor teacher attendance and reward teachers based on these reports.
Head teachers systematically overstated teacher presence and there was no improvement in teacher
performance (Chen, Glewwe, Kremer & Moulin 2001). Similarly, in India, teachers could reward
their pupils for attending school and were found to manipulate student presence figures (Linden &
Shastry 2012). Environmental auditors, when hired by the firms they investigated, systematically
understated the extent of pollution (Duflo, Greenstone, Pande & Ryan 2013). These examples
point to collusion, with the local monitor lying about agent performance in return for a share of
the reward.
Is collusion between local monitors and the targets of bureaucratic incentive schemes inevitable?
Conventional wisdom suggests as much. Campbell’s Law states that “the more any quantitative
social indicator is used for decision making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and
the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor”, and has
guided much thinking on accountability in schools and other domains of public sector organization
(Campbell 1979, Rothstein 2011, Neal 2013).
However, Campbell’s law need not always hold. Absent transaction costs, parties interested in
service delivery outcomes (parents, head teacher, teaching staff and government officials, say, in
an education context) can bargain to an efficient allocation of delivery effort. Side payments allow
frontline agents to internalize the social benefit of service provision, alongside their private cost
of effort. As others have observed (e.g. Dixit 1996), if service delivery outcomes are inefficiently
low, then transaction costs must be preventing the interested parties from bargaining effectively.
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Such frictions are widespread in low-income settings: financial constraints may limit the scope for
transferable utility, while physical distances and/or a lack of comprehension may impede informa-
tion flows and efforts to coordinate (Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster & Khemani 2010). And
observable measures of effort, such as presence, are correspondingly low (Chaudhury, Hammer,
Kremer, Muralidharan & Rogers 2006). It follows that a policy that reduces these frictions, for
instance by making payments based on local monitoring and thus putting transferable resources on
the table, could improve the efficiency of service delivery, precisely because of—not despite—the
role played by side payments. When this is the case, pay for locally monitored performance (here-
after referred to as P4LMP) may improve learning outcomes and have positive welfare and fiscal
consequences.
This paper sets out to answer three related questions at the heart of P4LMP in the context
of public service delivery. Can P4LMP induce improvements in service providers’ behavior? Does
P4LMP reduce or improve the quality of reported information for planning purposes? And what
is the overall welfare and fiscal impact?
To answer these questions, we conducted a randomized controlled trial in Ugandan public
primary schools, where we explored how incentives for primary school teachers can be effectively
designed when based on local monitoring by head teachers. This is an important issue in Ugandan
education: teacher absenteeism levels are such that pupils in rural, northern Uganda receive only
50 effective days of instruction in the entire school year (Wane & Martin 2013).1 Remote school
locations and limited resources for inspections make local monitors a particularly important source
of information on school inputs in this context.
Our experiment lasted for three school terms and varied the existence of financial stakes attached
to local monitoring reports. In one treatment (20 schools), our Info arm, head teachers were
requested to submit reports of teacher attendance using mobile technology. This information was
then collated and relayed back to the community. The second treatment, our Info & Bonus arm
(25 schools), was exactly the same, except that teachers received a bonus payment of UShs 40,000
if they were reported as present regularly over a month. This bonus payment was equivalent to
12 percent of an average teacher’s monthly salary and was paid monthly. Another forty schools
were randomly assigned to a control. We conducted our own independent spot-checks of teacher
presence (both prior to the intervention and during every term that the intervention took place),
which we then compared to headteacher reports. A school survey captured basic school and teacher
characteristics. We also measured learning outcomes and grade attainment for a cohort of students
that we tested before and after the intervention.
The key results are as follows. P4LMP improves teacher attendance but local monitoring alone
does not: there is a positive and significant treatment effect on teacher attendance in the Info &
Bonus arm, but not in the Info or Control arms. This translates into student enrollment gains
over the period of the study. Enrollment impacts are observed across all grades, but are highest
in grades where school dropouts are a serious problem. While these large compositional effects
1Comparable problems exist in schooling systems across the developing world (Chaudhury et al. 2006).
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preclude tight bounds on learning impacts,2 they are consistent with economically substantial
impacts on schooling attainment. P4LMP also improves the quality of information available to
district-level administrators relative to local monitoring alone: there are significantly fewer instances
of unreported absence, and no more instances of absence falsely reported as presence, in the Info
& Bonus arm compared to the Info arm.
We use these results to undertake a welfare analysis of moving from unincentivized to incen-
tivized locally monitored performance, using data from a representative household survey and
Uganda Revenue Authority tax receipts to estimate welfare and fiscal consequences. We place a fi-
nancial value on the expected total pupil benefit from improved teacher performance in three stages.
First, we calculate the impact on net enrollment, using data reported by school head teachers and
data from a tracked cohort of pupils. Second, we back out gains in grade attainment implied by the
enrollment figures. Third, we combine data from the Uganda National Panel Survey with estimates
from the literature on the causal return to schooling to calculate the increase in the net present
value (NPV) of future lifetime earnings due to higher grade attainment. We report estimates for
four scenarios based on the two data sets used to calculate enrollment gains and two discount
rates. Our preferred estimate is USD 1, 649. This figure exceeds the school-level bonus cost of
USD 597, implying that there is a welfare gain from attaching bonus payments to local monitoring
reports even before we consider the value of information. Since the quality of information in fact
improved with the introduction of financial incentives, we conclude that it is welfare-enhancing to
pay for locally monitored teacher attendance. We also show that moving from from unincentivized
to incentivized local monitoring is fiscally sustainable: the sum of the additional tax revenue per
school from increased lifetime earnings, combined with the amount that government has revealed
it is willing to pay for improved information, exceeds the per-school bonus cost.
We interpret these results through the lens of a theoretical model of P4LMP that illustrates
how attaching incentives to third-party reports can improve teacher performance and informational
outcomes. To begin, we model how the preferences of both teacher (agent) and head teacher
(monitor) affect teacher attendance and head-teacher monitoring and reporting, and how these
equilibrium outcomes depend on the financial stakes attached to the reports. To evaluate the
potential trade-off between performance and quality of information, the model also considers the
welfare of a bureaucracy that values teacher presence but also places a value on holding correct
beliefs about teacher absence. P4LMP introduces a source of transferable utility between head
teachers and teachers, who use this to bargain to locally efficient outcomes. Consistent with received
wisdom, there are parameter regions where P4LMP delivers no benefit in terms of either information
or teacher presence. However, we demonstrate that there are also parameter regions of positive
impact, namely when the cost of attendance is intermediate and the cost of monitoring is not too
high, so that it is mutually beneficial for the parties to agree on a side contract where the head
teacher effectively ‘pays’ the teacher to attend. Here, P4LMP incentivizes desired behavior and can
also provide unbiased information for planning purposes. Contrary to received wisdom, our study
2Specifically, estimated Lee (2009) bounds for the impact of P4LMP on student test scores span a zero impact.
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shows that P4LMP can improve both service delivery and the quality of information, and that this
dual objective can be met sufficiently cheaply to pass both welfare and fiscal sustainability tests.
This paper contributes to three aspects of the literature on state effectiveness in poor coun-
tries. First, a number of papers have sought to understand how incentives—both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary—impact the effort levels of frontline service providers. Researchers have typically
collected the performance metric themselves, whether administering student assessments to measure
outcomes of provider effort (Muralidharan & Sundararaman 2011), or administering tamper-proof
disposable cameras to measure teacher presence (Duflo, Hanna & Ryan 2012). Such experiments
provide proof of concept, demonstrating a necessary condition for impacts: that agents respond to
the performance incentive when ideally administered. Recent attempts to extend ‘automated’ mon-
itoring to the public sector have, however, proven challenging, notably in health in India (Banerjee,
Duflo & Glennerster 2007, Dhaliwal & Hanna 2014) and in education in Haiti (Adelman, Blimpo,
Evans, Simbou & Yarrow 2015). These experiences underscore the importance of studying, as we
do, how monitoring contracts and technologies interact with the preferences of local parties.
Second, there is growing interest in applying the lens of public finance to experimental and
quasi-experimental evaluations of public policies in developing countries. Baird, Hicks, Kremer &
Miguel (2016), for example, calculate the long-term financial gain due to improved health of children
that received de-worming in Kenya. They argue that the additional tax revenue from future income
alone is sufficient to pay for the program. Similar approaches have been taken in recent work on tax
policy (Best, Brockmeyer, Kleven, Spinnewijn & Waseem 2015) and unemployment benefits (Gerard
& Gonzaga 2014). Our paper speaks to this interest. In addition to cost-benefit analysis, we also
consider the fiscal consequences of the intervention and show that moving from unincentivized to
incentivized locally monitored performance generates sufficient additional tax revenue to be fiscally
sustainable.
Third, a small but growing body of literature documents the prospects of digital technologies
to improve public service delivery.3 As with mobile money, such technologies offer opportunities
to circumvent frictions that otherwise lead to market failures (Suri, Jack & Stoker 2012, Suri &
Jack 2016, Muralidharan, Niehaus & Sukhtankar 2016). Callen and coauthors (2016) demonstrate
that information collected by smartphones (in place of paper forms) on health worker absence
‘crowds in’ central inspections in politically competitive constituencies. Aker and Ksoll (2015) find
that phone calls by government officials to local parties (teachers, community representatives, and a
random sub-sample of students) improve learning outcomes of an adult education program in Niger.
Our paper contributes to this hitherto empirical literature by using theory to study how digital
technologies interact with the preferences of local actors to determine responses to the incentive
environment.
3As the 2016 World Developement Report notes, digital technologies can help improve service delivery by: in-
forming citizens; streamlining processes; receiving feedback; and “improving service provider management through
better monitoring so that government workers both show up at work and are productive” (WDR 2016, p. 157). Our
paper is part of the literature documenting the fourth of these so-called “digital dividends”.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the field experiment and
data. Section 3 reports estimates of impacts on our outcomes of interest: teacher attendance,
student enrollment and learning outcomes, and the quality of information available to district-level
school administrators. Section 4 considers implications for welfare and fiscal sustainability. Section
5 interprets the experimental results through the lens of a theoretical model. Section 6 offers
concluding remarks, including scaling up the intervention in Uganda and external validity.
2 Field Experiment
2.1 Context
The study took place in 85 rural, government primary schools drawn from six different districts of
Uganda: Apac, Gulu, Hoima, Iganga, Kiboga, and Mpigi. These districts span the four regions of
Uganda. The first column in Table 1 shows some basic descriptive statistics of the teachers and
schools in our sample. At the time of the baseline survey in July 2012, these study schools were
experiencing challenges typical of education delivery in low-income countries. The teacher presence
rate of 74 percent is comparable to previous estimates for rural, government schools in Uganda, and
is also consistent with rates documented across the developing world (Chaudhury et al. 2006, Wane
& Martin 2013, Bold, Filmer, Martin, Molina, Stacy, Svensson & Wane 2017).4 Table 1 further
shows that 59 percent of the teachers are male, and 79 percent have at least completed primary
school. Their average monthly salary is UShs 326,049 (roughly USD 120, or 2.3 times Uganda’s
per capita GDP in 2012), which is slightly lower than in most developing countries.5 The average
pupil-teacher ratio of 45 : 1 is comparable to previous estimates in Uganda (Wane & Martin 2013),
and not much different to the average across all low-income countries of 42 : 1 (World Bank 2017).
Uganda is also similar to many developing countries, in that it has succeeded in obtaining near
universal primary school enrollment (94 percent primary school enrollment in 2013, compared to 90
percent globally), yet pupils’ learning trajectory in primary schools remains low (Bold et al. 2017).
2.2 Experimental Design
The field experiment compared the impact of two local monitoring schemes, under which head
teachers were prompted to submit daily reports of teacher attendance. The two schemes were
identical except for one key feature: in the Info & Bonus arm, these reports triggered bonus
payments for teaching staff, whereas in the Info arm, no such financial incentives were attached.
4The World Bank’s Service Delivery Indicators for Uganda reports a teacher absenteeism rate in rural, government
schools of 30 percent (Wane & Martin 2013), and average teacher absence rate of 23 percent across six different African
countries, ranging from 15 percent in Kenya and 45 percent in Mozambique (Bold et al. 2017).
5In 2017, primary school teachers in India, for example, earn roughly 3.2 times India’s GDP per capita; in Tanzania
this ratio is 3.8 : 1. As of 2017, in Uganda in the ratio for regular government teachers ranges between 2.1 and 2.5.
For head teachers, the ratio ranges between 3.1 and 4.1. Note that we were only able to collect teacher salary data
at endline and have it for a reduced sample of teachers.
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Both local monitoring schemes were built on a mobile-based platform developed by software
engineers at the Makerere University School of Computing and Informatics Technology. The Java-
based platform, accessible from low-cost phones, provided a customized form to the assigned moni-
tors in each school, which was pre-populated with the names and unique identifiers for all teachers.
(A comprehensive teacher list for every school was collected during baseline data collection, and
updated during every round of spot-checks.) To ensure availability and installation, this platform
was added to a phone that we provided, with instructions that it be kept in the administrative
offices of the school.6
In both treatment arms, head teachers were asked to submit daily reports of the attendance of
each teacher on their staff, alongside their own attendance. If the head teacher was absent, then a
deputy could submit a report.7 At the end of each month, we broadcast a summary report to school
stakeholders via SMS that collated the presence of teachers on four randomly chosen days—one
day from each week of the month. In the Info & Bonus arm, reported teacher attendance triggered
a bonus payment of UShs 40,000 (roughly USD 15) if teachers were marked present on all four
randomly selected days that month.8 In the months with fewer than four weeks of school, the
bonus payment was calculated in proportion to the number of school weeks in that month (e.g.
UShs 10, 000 if only one week of school in that month). Figure A.1 shows that the median and
modal monthly salary of regular government teachers in our sample was UShs 320,000 (roughly
USD 120), with the majority of salaries falling between UShs 300, 000 and UShs 400, 000. The
bonus therefore typically ranged between 10 and 13 percent of monthly salary.
Stratifying by district, we randomly assigned 40 schools to a control arm in which no monitoring
intervention took place, 20 schools to the Info arm, and 25 schools to the Info & Bonus arm.9 The
intervention was implemented in September 2012 at the beginning of the third school term, and
lasted for a year, until the end of the second school term of 2013.
2.3 Implementation
We worked with World Vision to train head teachers and their deputies in the use of this platform,
and to explain its purpose to the broader school community. Training took place during September
2012. Prior to this date, District Education Officers sent a letter to each school to inform the
head teacher of the training and when it would happen. The officers also called head teachers
and all members of the school management committee in advance, and asked the head teacher to
6This design feature, in combination with the norm that head teachers should directly observe presence when
monitoring, is consistent with our interpretation that submitting reports is costly to the monitor, as discussed in
Section 5 and the theoretical model of Appendix B.
7Although two reports could be submitted on the same day, this happened on just 14 of the 6,525 possible reporting
school days (0.21 percent); the second report was treated as an update and correction of the first for analytical and
award purposes in these cases. Deputy head teachers took on the monitoring role in addition to their teaching
responsibilities at the school.
8To mitigate equity concerns, and because absenteeism was typically equally prevalent among all staff, head
teachers and their deputies were eligible for the bonus based on their self-reported attendance. Head teacher and
deputy head teacher outcomes are excluded from the main analysis of the paper.
9An additional 95 schools were also allocated to other monitoring schemes, which are not the focus of this paper.
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invite all parents and a selection of pupil representatives to the training meetings. These meetings
typically took place over two afternoons. On the first afternoon, the trainers talked with school
stakeholders—teachers, head teachers, members of the school management committee, parents, and
pupil representatives—and explained to them the basic functioning of the program. World Vision
staff also collected mobile phone numbers from every school stakeholder who declared an interest
in receiving monthly updates of teacher attendance via SMS. On the second afternoon, trainers
showed the head teachers and their deputies how to submit reports on the phone and also assigned
them unique IDs. The monitors were asked to keep these IDs private because they were required
to log onto the platform. Schools were told that the program would start in October 2012.
The intervention ran through August 2013. Monitor engagement and the content of reports
submitted, which we discuss as an outcome of payment for locally monitored performance in Section
3, were consistent across terms, showing no evidence of decline in interest. In the Info & Bonus
arm, accumulated bonuses were paid to teachers’ bank accounts at the end of each school term.
The average total payout per school over the course of this year-long implementation was USD
597. Figure A.2(a) shows the distribution of cumulative bonus payouts for the sample of teachers
that were in the Info & Bonus treatment arm at the beginning of the study. The red line indicates
that the mean payout was UShs 98, 069 (USD 37). The majority of teachers in our sample, 58
percent, received at least two bonus payouts, and 92 percent received at least one bonus payout.
Four teachers received the maximum payout of UShs 290, 000 (USD 109).10 Figure A.2(b) shows
that the probability of a day being selected to trigger the bonus payment was equal across the
working week, as one would expect given our randomization.11
2.4 Outcomes of Interest
There are two categories of outcome that could be impacted by the local monitoring schemes
described in Section 2.2. The first category covers school behavior. Naturally, our hope is that
local monitoring improves teacher attendance, and that financial incentives strengthen this effect
rather than undermine it. To the extent that local monitoring improves teacher attendance, we may
also see an impact on students. Having a teacher present more often should improve the student
learning outcomes of a given cohort of students. Anticipating this, parents may be more willing to
keep their children in school, thereby increasing student enrollment.
The second category of outcome relates to the information available to district-level school
administrators. Local monitoring reports submitted by SMS could supplement, or even replace,
the information collected in district-led school inspections. It seems natural to look at the frequency
of reporting here, and we do include this outcome in Section 3 below. Arguably, however, district-
10In months in which schools were not open for all weeks, bonuses were computed as a weekly piece rate, reflecting
the number of weeks in which the teacher qualified as present. Alternative combinations of these weekly values
explain the intermediate values in the support of the distribution of teachers’ total bonus payouts.
11This figure does not include data from the first month of the study period (November 2012). In the first month,
we randomly selected a day from among the days in a week when a report was actually submitted (rather than
randomly selecting a day of the week). We did this at the start of the program to build credibility.
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level administrators are principally interested in the volume of reporting, in that this will provide
them with more accurate beliefs. For this reason, we focus on a measure of the quality of information
that captures both reporting frequency and accuracy. Specifically, guided by the statistical decision
theory literature, we think in terms of a (Bayesian) district-level school administrator’s ability to
correctly predict teacher attendance. Suppose such an administrator is asked to predict whether
a given teacher is present or absent on a given day. The administrator will predict the teacher to
be present if, reflecting on any local monitoring report received, he/she believes this is more likely
than the teacher being absent. If the teacher is indeed present this prediction is correct, and if the
teacher is absent this prediction is incorrect. The theoretical model set out in Appendix B shows
that an incorrect prediction can occur in the following circumstances: (i) the teacher is absent but
falsely reported as present; (ii) the teacher is present, but falsely reported as absent; and (iii) the
teacher is absent, but no monitoring report is filed.12 In Section 3, we compare the rate of each
of these outcomes, as well as their sum (our measure of the quality of information) across the two
treatment arms.
2.5 Data Collection
Our analysis draws from four sources of data: head teacher reports of teacher attendance submitted
by mobile phone, our own independent spot-checks of teacher attendance, a school survey, and
student scores on independently administered numeracy and literacy tests.13 We conducted random
spot-checks of teacher attendance, both before the intervention started and during every term
that the intervention took place: July 2012 (pre-intervention baseline), November 2012 (Term 1),
April/May 2013 (Term 2), and August 2013 (Term 3).14 This data is at the teacher-day level: each
observation is a different spot-check for a different teacher. We then matched this data set of teacher
attendance with the monitoring reports for the same teacher on the same day. A school survey
was conducted in July 2012 and November 2013 (post-intervention endline), providing additional
information about school and teacher characteristics. Finally, we track the outcomes of a sample of
20 pupils who were in grade three in a pre-intervention assessment taken two years prior to the start
of our study (hereafter the tracked cohort). For these students, we observe their enrollment status
at endline, and conditional on enrollment, their rate of grade progression and learning outcomes.
To minimize risk of Hawthorne effects, we went to great length to ensure that data collection
was independent. Field workers employed for data collection were not the same as the World
Vision staff that implemented the program, and they carried identification issued by the Uganda
Bureau of Statistics; spot-check visits to schools were conducted on dates unrelated to the training
12Strictly speaking, our model predicts that only outcomes (i) and (iii) will occur in equilibrium.
13These tests were administered by the Uganda National Examinations Board, using papers from the preceding
year’s National Assessment of Progress in Education (NAPE). The NAPE is an exam sat by students in a nationally
representative sample of schools for purposes of tracking learning progress in the education system as a whole; none
of these schools were in our sample, so students would not have had prior sight of the questions.
14The school year coincides with the calendar year in Uganda. To avoid confusion, we refer to terms based on the
chronology of our intervention. For example, the third term of the 2012 school year is our Term 1, etc.
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and implementation of the intervention; and field workers communicated clearly that their data
collection was independent, not shared with government, and without consequences for school staff.
We did not announce when field workers would visit schools, or that they would be conducting
multiple visits, so head teachers did not know if or when to expect them.
Table 1 shows the balance of variables at baseline. The third column shows the mean values for
the control group. The final three columns report differences in means across the stated arms (based
on coefficients from regressing each characteristic on the set of treatment dummies, controlling
for district fixed effects, clustering the standard errors at the school level and constructing p-
values using the cluster wild bootstrap method). The sample is balanced across all arms for most
characteristics. Importantly, there is no statistically significant difference in the teacher attendance
rate or pupil enrollment figures, two key outcome variables for this paper. Statistical significance is
observed for three out of the 36 comparisons, which is no more than would be expected by chance.
Table 1 also shows that 17 percent of teachers sampled at baseline are no longer at the school
at endline. The most common reasons for leaving the school are routine transfer to another school,
and retirement (61 and 10 percent respectively). Importantly, this attrition rate is balanced across
treatment arms, so differential changes in teacher composition across treatment arms are not biasing
any results. Moreover, the replacement rate is constant, so the average number of teachers per
school is almost exactly the same at the end of the study. We took care to update the teacher list
during every round of independent spot-checks, ensuring that teachers are not incorrectly recorded
as absent after they have left the school. Teachers who joined the school after the start of the
program are excluded from the analysis.
2.6 Empirical Strategy
To estimate impacts on teacher attendance, we use two specifications. The first is a simple cross-




δt + γ1 (Info)s + γ2 (Info&Bonus)s + ρd + εi,s,t, (1)
where: Yi,s,t is a binary indicator of attendance for teacher i in school s in post-treatment time
period t; δt are time dummies for each of the three rounds of post-treatment data collection; ρd
refers to district fixed effects; (Info)s and (Info&Bonus)s are the two treatment dummies; and εi,s,t
is an error term.15
Our second, preferred specification makes use of baseline data, as recommended by McKenzie
(2012)
Yi,s,t = θYi,s,PRE +
3∑
t=1
δt + γ1 (Info)s + γ2 (Info&Bonus)s + ρd + εi,s,t, (2)
15Since we stratified our sample at district level, in the tables below we refer to the presence of strata indicators
rather than district fixed effects.
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where Yi,s,PRE is baseline attendance for teacher i in school s. In both specifications, we pool
treatment impacts across post-treatment rounds of data collection. Robustness checks confirming
the absence of time-varying treatment effects on teacher attendance are reported in Section 3.2.1.
To estimate impacts on student enrollment, we use the following specifications
Ys = θYs,PRE + γ1 (Info)s + γ2 (Info&Bonus)s + ρd + εs (3)
Yi,s = γ1 (Info)s + γ2 (Info&Bonus)s + ρd + εi,s, (4)
where: in the first school-level regression Ys and Ys,PRE are counts of total enrollment in school s
at endline and baseline respectively; in the second pupil-level regression Yi,s is a binary indicator of
enrollment at endline for tracked cohort pupil i in school s; and all other independent variables are
defined as above. For inferential purposes, we allow the error terms from equations 1, 2 and C.1 to
be arbitrarily correlated within schools. Given the small number of clusters in the study, we further
estimate p-values using the cluster wild bootstrap method (Cameron, Gelbach & Miller 2008).
Turning to student learning outcomes, the analysis is complicated by differential sample selection
across experimental arms. There is less drop out in the Info & Bonus arm, and data from the
tracked cohort indicate that students who dropped out performed worse (although not statistically
significantly so) in both numeracy and literacy tests sat prior to the intervention, relative to their
peers who remained enrolled. Because the bias that arises from potentially non-random sample
selection that differs across study arms cannot be signed a priori, we take a Lee Bounds approach
(Lee 2009) and examine test score levels at endline for a trimmed subsample of the tracked cohort.
For any pairwise comparison of treatment arms, this approach places bounds on the treatment
effect experienced by the subset of students who would have remained in the sample under either
treatment condition. To calculate the lower bound, this estimator drops the best-performing pupils
from the group with the lower attrition rate (here, the Info & Bonus arm) such that the attrition
rate in each experimental arm is equal. For the upper bound, the sample selection assumption
is reversed, and the estimator drops the worst-performing pupils from the group with the lower
attrition rate. Unconditional means (of endline test scores for students remaining in the sample)
are then compared across experimental arms.





δt + γ2 (Info&Bonus)s + ρd + εi,s,t, (5)
where Yi,s,t is a binary variable for teacher i in school s in post-treatment time period t that is, in
turn, coded to 1 if: (1) a local monitoring report was submitted; (2) the teacher was absent and a
report was submitted indicating he/she was present; (3) the teacher was present and a report was
submitted indicating he/she was absent; (4) the teacher was absent and no report was submitted;




In this subsection, we report results for our main outcomes of interest: teacher attendance, student
enrollment, student learning, and quality of information. To summarize, both teacher attendance
and the quality of information improved with the introduction of bonus payments. Due to sub-
stantial increases in enrollment in the Info & Bonus arm, we cannot make any definitive claims on
impacts on student learning, due to the possibility of non-random student attrition.
Teacher attendance Figure 1(a) shows that teacher attendance increased when financial incen-
tives were attached to local monitoring. On the days when we conducted independent spot-checks,
teachers were 9 and 10 percentage points more likely to be present in the Info & Bonus schools
compared to Info and Control schools respectively. Table 2 Column (1) confirms that the difference
between Info & Bonus and Control schools is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and (in
the final row) that the difference between Info & Bonus and Info schools is statistically significant
at the 10 percent level. Teacher attendance was not significantly higher in Info schools relative to
Control schools.
Student enrollment Figure 2 plots average enrollment by grade in Info and Info & Bonus
schools, as reported in the endline survey. Two facts stand out. First, in both treatment arms
there is a downward trend in enrollment. This is consistent with the prevailing view that school
dropouts are a serious concern in Uganda.16 Second, at each grade, average enrollment is higher
in Info & Bonus schools relative to Info schools, suggesting that paying for locally monitored
performance may have been more successful at averting dropouts.
Table 2 verifies that the enrollment gain (or rather reduced loss) in Info & Bonus schools
is statistically significant. Column (3) reports results from estimating the school-level model in
equation (3) using our baseline and endline survey data.17 Schools in the Info & Bonus arm report
on average 47 more pupils enrolled across all grades compared with Control schools (8 percent
increase), and 70 more pupils compared to Info schools (13 percent increase). This finding is
corroborated in Table 2 Column (4), which reports results from estimating the pupil-level model
in equation (4) using data for a cohort of 20 pupils surveyed in 2010 as part of a previous study
and representative of those enrolled in Primary 3. We tracked the enrollment outcomes of these
children during our endline survey in November 2013. In the Control schools, only 34 percent of
these children were still enrolled in the same school three years later. In Info & Bonus schools,
the percentage of the tracked cohort still enrolled in 2013 was 14 percentage points higher than
16Official records indicate that only 30 percent of pupils nationwide enrolled in Grade 1 make it to Grade 7 (Ministry
of Education and Sports, 2014:121). In our Control schools, the number of pupils in Grade 7 is on average 40 percent
of the number of pupils in Grade 1.
17Baseline data are missing in two schools due to enumerator error, prompting us to use EMIS 2012 data. We feel
confident doing this because our enrollment figures correspond closely to the EMIS data. In fact, the 2013 figures
were exactly the same for the two schools with absent 2012 data. Results hold when we drop those two schools.
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in Control schools, and 9 percentage points higher than in Info schools. The similarity of results
across the two different data sets is reassuring and suggests that the enrollment impacts are due to
the introduction of financial incentives.
Student learning outcomes Table 3 shows results from constructing Lee Bounds on student
learning outcomes, comparing unconditional means of the school-level change in test scores cal-
culated using the trimmed sub-samples. The odd-numbered columns show results for the literacy
test, and the even-numbered columns the results for numeracy. The first two columns compare
the difference in learning outcomes between the Info & Bonus arm and the Control schools; the
next two columns compare Info and Info & Bonus schools; and the final two columns compare Info
and Control schools. The first and third row indicate the lower and upper bounds respectively.
The third-last row shows the total number of observations for the full sample, including those who
dropped out (i.e. 20 pupils per school); the second-last row shows the number of pupils still at
the school; and the final row shows the proportion of non-missing observations dropped from the
treatment arm with higher retention. It is clear from Table 3 that large differentials in rates of
retention across treatment arms invalidate any assessment of learning outcomes. Depending on
the assumption relating to sample selection, one could infer that the Info & Bonus arm had a
statistically significant positive or negative impact on learning gains.18
Quality of information We begin by comparing the frequency of reporting across the two
treatment arms. Table 4 Column (1) shows results from estimating equation (5) using our data on
teacher days with independent spot-checks, and shows that the availability of financial incentives
increased reporting frequency.19 The probability of a local monitor submitting a report was 18
percentage points higher in the Info & Bonus arm compared to the Info arm, a difference that is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
To capture the accuracy as well as the frequency of reporting, we compare our spot-checks of
teacher attendance with the local monitoring report for the same teacher on the same day (if one
was submitted). Figure 3 shows this graphically. The dark red part of the bars shows the rate
of absence falsely reported as presence. Consistent with common intuition, this source of mistake
occurs in the Info & Bonus arm (on 8 percent of teacher-days with independent spot-checks) but,
interestingly, also in the Info arm (on 7 percent of teacher-days with independent spot-checks). The
grey shading shows the rate of presence falsely reported as absence. In both treatment arms this
outcome is rare, and we strongly suspect it is due to measurement error.20 Table 4 Columns (2)
18The range is largest in Table 3 Columns (1) and (2). This is because attrition was largest in the Control arm, so
a larger proportion of observations in the Info & Bonus group need to be dropped.
19We use the sub-sample of teacher days on which we conducted independent spot-checks for consistency across
columns. Table 5 below shows results for the full sample of days.
20There are two possibilities here. First, head teachers may have made reporting errors, either hitting the wrong
button for a given teacher, or filing their report on the wrong day. We did our best to clean the latter (e.g. reports on
weekends or public holidays) but cannot rule out the former. Second, there may have been late arrivals, i.e. teachers
who arrived between the time that the head teacher monitored and our independent enumerators visited the school.
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and (3) confirm that there is no statistically significant difference in either form of false reporting
across the two treatment arms. The light blue shading shows the rate of unreported absence. This
number is 9 percentage points higher in Info schools relative to Info & Bonus schools (16 percent
versus 7 percent); a difference that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level as shown in
Table 4 Column (4). The overall height of the bars in Figure 3 depicts our measure of the quality
of information—the probability with which a (Bayesian) district-level school administrator would
make an incorrect prediction of teacher attendance. This rate is 6.7 percentage points higher in
the Info arm than in the Info & Bonus arm (and, unsurprisingly, substantially higher still in the
Control arm). Since Table 4 Column (5) confirms that the difference between treatment arms is
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, we conclude that P4LMP generated higher quality
information relative to local monitoring alone.
3.2 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we perform three robustness checks: we test for dynamic impacts on teacher
attendance, we look at reporting behavior throughout the period of the intervention including days
on which independent spot-checks did not take place, and we employ two different strategies to test
for Hawthorne effects. All these checks yield results that are consistent with our main estimates.
3.2.1 Does teacher attendance change over time?
One threat to the policy implications of our study is that teachers and their local monitors may
change behavior over time, such that the effects reported above might not be expected to persist.
To address this, we allow for a more general specification where the treatment effect on teacher
attendance can vary across terms. Specifically, we estimate the following equation









γ2,t (Info&Bonusi,s,t) + ρd + εi,s,t (6)
where Infoi,s,t = Infoi,s × δt. The treatment effects γ1,t and γ2,t are thus allowed to vary across
time. We cannot reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients on each treatment arm remain
the same over time; in other words, we cannot reject the null of joint equality: γ1,1 = γ1,2 = γ1,3
(p = 0.33); and γ2,1 = γ2,2 = γ2,3 (p = 0.98). When comparing only the Info and Info & Bonus
treatment arms, we estimate






γ2,t (Info&Bonusi,s,t) + ρd + εi,s,t. (7)
Again, we cannot reject the null of joint equality: γ2,1 = γ2,2 = γ2,3 (p = 0.96). Figure 2(b) depicts
teacher attendance by treatment arm and term of exposure, and shows graphically that impacts
Our field teams endeavored to arrive at the start of the school day, but this was not always possible.
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are remarkably stable across the duration of the program. At least during the period of our study,
we saw no evidence of evolution in reporting or teacher behavior that would suggest a threat to
sustainability of impacts.
3.2.2 Are results based on spot-check days representative?
Since our independent spot-checks of teacher attendance are collected only during specific weeks of
each term, one might be concerned that behavior during these periods is somehow unrepresentative.
For instance, proximity to holiday periods or exam dates might affect teacher attendance. For the
sake of consistency, all of the results in Section 3.1 are based on teacher days with independent
spot-checks, even when the outcome under consideration depends only on reports generated by the
intervention. Although by construction we cannot estimate actual teacher attendance outside of
spot-check periods, we can test if the impacts on reporting behavior hold over the whole duration
of the program. Table 5 expands the sample to include all days on which a report could have been
submitted. The dependent variable indicates whether at least one monitoring report was submitted
on a given day for a given school or not. The coefficient shows that, on average over the duration
of the program, reporting was 10 percentage points higher in Info & Bonus schools than in Info
schools. This confirms that the result based only on spot check days is robust to using the full
sample of reports from the entire duration of the program.
3.2.3 Are the experimental impacts due to Hawthorne effects?
Even though we took steps to maintain independence between the program and the unannounced
spot-checks (as discussed in Section 2), one might still be concerned that our measurement activities
had a direct impact upon teacher attendance. If such a Hawthorne effect varied between treatment
arms (for example, if teachers in the Info & Bonus arm were more responsive to our visits because
they mistakenly believed that spot checks had an implication for their bonus payments), then this
would necessitate a different interpretation of results. In this subsection we discuss two different
tests that we use to rule out any evidence of Hawthorne effects.
First, in anticipation of the need to test for Hawthorne effects, we randomly varied the frequency
of measurement (1, 2 or 3 visits) in our first round of spot-checks. If our spot-checks did induce a
behavioral response that is correlated with treatment, then we would expect a stronger impact in
schools that received more visits. Table 6 reports results from a regression of subsequent teacher
attendance on the number of visits during the first round of spot-checks, together with an interaction
term between treatment status and the number of spot-checks. The first two columns report results
for the second term only, since a Hawthorne effect, if one exists, should be larger immediately after
the measurement activity. Column (1) reports results for the specification in Table 2 based on
equation (2) and gives average impacts for the second term. Column (2) adds in the number
of spot-checks and an interaction between treatment status and spot-checks. We observe that
subsequent teacher attendance is no different for schools that received more/fewer visits in the first
term. Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction terms are small and statistically insignificant
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at conventional levels; that is, there is no evidence of a stronger treatment impact in schools
that received more visits. To increase statistical power, the final two columns report results for the
second and third terms combined. Even in this expanded sample, the coefficients on the interaction
terms remain insignificant.21
Second, even though by construction it is impossible to test if actual teacher attendance differed
across spot-check and non-spot-check days, we can test if reporting was any different. Table 7 shows
that the treatment impact of introducing teacher bonus payments on reporting behavior (both the
probability of submitting a report and reporting a teacher as present) was not different on days
when we conducted an independent spot-check. Column (1) reports data at the school-day level,
restricted to the dates when we were conducting independent spot-checks in at least one school.22
The dependent variable indicates whether at least one monitoring report was submitted on a given
day for a given school or not. Column (2) reports data at the teacher-day level. Here, the dependent
variable indicates whether the teacher was reported present on that day or not (either because no
report took place, or because the teacher was reported absent). For both columns, we regress
the outcome on the Info & Bonus treatment dummy, a dummy indicating whether we conducted
an independent spot-check at the school on the given day or not, and the interaction between
the two variables. The coefficients on the treatment dummy show that there was a statistically
significant impact on the days when we did not conduct spot-checks. Reporting behavior on average
was no different on days when we conducted spot-checks, compared to days when we did not.
The coefficients and standard errors on the interaction term mean that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the impact of treatment was the same on spot-check and non-spot-check days.
Once again, we find no evidence that our measurement activities in any way changed the impact
of the program.
4 Welfare Analysis
Section 3 delivered estimates of impacts on teacher attendance, student enrollment, student learn-
ing outcomes, and the quality of information. Although these results established that attaching
financial incentives to local monitoring reports was effective at increasing teacher attendance and
student enrollment, and actually improved the quality of information available to district-level
school administrators, this does not answer the welfare question: what should a policymaker do?
That answer depends not only on the magnitude of behavioral responses to the intervention, but
also the cost of bonus payments—in our experiment, an average of USD 597 per school—and on
the social values placed on school behavior and the quality of information.
21We repeated this analysis for the five dependent variables related to the quality of information in Table 4. Reas-
suringly, we also found that subsequent informational outcomes are no different for schools that received more/fewer
visits in the first term. These results are available upon request.
22We restrict the sample to the spot-check period because we only want to pick up differences that are due to our
school visits, rather than different times of the year. As noted above, Table 5 confirms that our results hold when
looking at the whole duration of the program. We define a spot-check period as days when an independent spot-check
was conducted for at least one school.
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We focus on what we consider to be the more interesting welfare comparison: moving from an
unincentivized to an incentivized local monitoring scheme, i.e., from Info to Info & Bonus. We
quantify the expected total pupil benefit from the introduction of bonus payments in two steps.
First, we back out gains in grade attainment moving from Info to Info & Bonus implied by the
enrollment figures reported in Table 2. Second, we combine data from the Uganda National Panel
Survey with estimates from the literature on the causal return to schooling to calculate the increase
in NPV of future lifetime earnings due to this higher grade attainment, valued in USD. These two
steps are summarized in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.23
We answer the welfare question in Section 4.3. Specfically, we calculate the average gain in
NPV per school of future lifetime earnings due to higher grade attainment, minus the average
bonus cost per school for four scenarios (based on different datasets and discount rates). We find
that, in the most reasonable scenario, this sum is positive. Since the quality of information was
also higher under Info & Bonus than Info, we conclude that it is welfare-enhancing to pay for
locally monitored teacher attendance. As an extension, we also consider whether moving from
Info to Info & Bonus is fiscally sustainable, in the sense that the additional tax take per school
from the increased lifetime earnings exceeds the bonus cost per school . We report estimates for
eight scenarios (based on different datasets, discount rates, and tax evasion rates) and find that
in the most conservative scenario the additional tax take per school falls just short of the bonus
cost per school. After accounting for how much government values higher quality of information
(as revealed by its current spending on school inspections), however, we conclude that it is also
fiscally sustainable to pay for locally monitored performance. Below, we summarize the analysis
underlying these conclusions, relegating a detailed discussion to Appendix B. For convenience and
clarity, inputs into and outputs from each of these steps are summarized in Table 8.
4.1 Moving from Enrollment to Grade Attainment
In Section 3, we reported that P4LMP increased student enrollment compared to monitoring alone.
However, this finding does not necessarily imply a causal impact on grade attainment, as grade
repetition and inbound transfers from other schools are also possibilities. To model the impact of
increased enrollment on grade attainment, we back out the portion of the enrollment gain that is
due to ‘averted dropouts’ for each grade, rather than grade repeaters, using two separate empirical
strategies (see Appendix B.1). Our first approach combines our survey data on enrollment with
administrative data on grade repetition. Our second approach derives annual dropout and repe-
tition rates from differences in reduced-form dropout and repetition probabilities observed for the
tracked sample surveyed in 2010 and 2013. These estimates are reported in the fourth and sixth
23We do not incorporate our results on student learning outcomes into the welfare analysis for three reasons.
First, as discussed in subsection 3.1, the differential enrollment induced by the intervention means that we cannot
credibly causally identify impacts on learning. Second, placing a contextually relevant economic value on learning
gains is difficult given the paucity of studies relating these to labor market outcomes in developing countries: studies
of the relationship between cognitive skills and earnings tend to focus on OECD economies (Hanushek, Schwerdt,
Wiederhold & Woessmann 2015). Third, given a set of estimates of grade attainment impacts, a general problem is
that these partly embody learning gains, creating a risk of double-counting benefits.
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columns of Table 9 respectively. For example, using the tracked sample of students (our cohort
data) we estimate that on average 12.56 fewer pupils per school dropped out in Grade 1, 9.76 fewer
pupils in Grade 2, and so on. Results are qualitatively similar from the two approaches, despite
their differences in identifying assumptions, as discussed further in Appendix C.
To translate averted dropouts into impacts on grade attainment, we conservatively assume that
each averted dropout progresses only one additional grade before dropping out. To the extent
that the returns to additional years of schooling, net of the cost of delayed labor-market entry, are
positive for all students who would have dropped out prior to Grade 7 in the absence of P4LMP,
this assumption provides a lower bound. Other assumptions are possible: one could, for example,
assume that averted dropouts go on to follow the attainment profile typical of students observed to
complete at least one more year of schooling in the absence of treatment. Because we do not know
how unobserved correlates of dropout for students completing at least one more year relate to the
characteristics of those causally induced to obtain an additional year of school, further assumptions
are required to place an upper bound on these impacts. In particular, we would require post-
primary grade attainment data outside of our sample. We do not report such estimates here to
focus attention on a lower bound in which we have greater confidence. As it turns out, this lower
bound will be sufficient to guide the policy decision on both welfare and fiscal criteria.
4.2 Moving from Grade Attainment to Earnings
The next step in the welfare analysis is to place a financial value on the increase in grade attainment
due to averted dropouts. As set out in Appendix B.2, we use a simple NPV model based on the
following assumptions. There are two sectors: formal wage employment where wages evolve with
years of experience, and subsistence agriculture where earnings are constant, both over the lifetime
and with respect to education. All pupils start school aged 7, do not repeat a grade, obtain no more
than Grade 7,24 and leave formal employment aged 60. Grade attainment has a causal effect on both
the probability of formal sector employment and the associated formal wage, but not on earnings
from subsistence agriculture. Given these assumptions, for each grade s = 1, ..., 6, we write down
two potential NPVs: an outcome with s years of schooling, denoted NPV 0s , and an outcome with a
causally induced additional year of schooling, for an individual who would otherwise have obtained
s years of schooling, denoted NPV 1s . Since the observational earnings profile {NPV 01 , NPV 02 , . . .}
embodies both selection and treatment effects for each level of schooling, it will not be the case
in general that NPV 1s = NPV
0




s is the grade-specific
NPV gain associated with being induced to attain an additional year of schooling by moving from
Info to Info & Bonus. Since an additional year of schooling delays but uplifts expected future
earnings, this net gain could in principle be positive or negative.
To calculate these grade-specific NPVs, we require a variety of numbers: a discount rate, two
24Because we do not have data to allow estimates of attainment impacts beyond Grade 7 (our study sample
comprises primary schools only), we effectively assume that P4LMP never induces students who would not otherwise
do so to obtain more than seven years of education. Consequently, assumptions about the NPV of earnings for levels
of schooling above Grade 7 do not affect our results.
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dimensions of the causal impact of schooling (an effect on the probability of formal sector employ-
ment and a rate of return on the formal sector wage), two time series (formal sector employment
probabilities and wages), and constant agricultural earnings. As discussed in Appendix B.2, we
take the first three from the prior literature, and estimate the latter three using data from the
2011/12 Uganda National Panel Survey. Table 9 summarizes the calculation for one configuration
of parameters, specifically a discount rate of 3.5 percent, causal effects of schooling of 1 percent
and 6.8 percent on the probability of formal sector employment and the formal sector wage respec-
tively, time series of formal sector employment probabilities and wages predicted from Table C.2,
and an agricultural wage of USD 228. Table 9 Column (2) reports our estimate of the grade-specific
outcome NPV 0s , and Column (3) our estimate of the gain NPV
1
s −NPV 0s .25 Column (5) reports
the total NPV gain for each grade, multiplying by the number of averted dropouts estimated (as
described in Appendix B.1) using our administrative data; Column (7) does likewise for our cohort
data. Summing over grades we therefore arrive at two estimates of the NPV gain at school-level.
Each estimate puts a USD financial value on the average increase in grade attainment per school
due to treatment under Info & Bonus rather than under Info alone.
4.3 Welfare Comparison and Fiscal Sustainability
To make a statement about welfare, we compare the average gain in NPV per school of future
lifetime earnings due to higher grade attainment (calculated as set out in Section 4.1 and 4.2) with
the average bonus cost per school of USD 597. The first row in Table 10 reports the average NPV
earnings gain per school for four scenarios, based on the two datasets used to calculate enrollment
gains and two discount rates. Our preferred estimate is USD 1, 649, shown in the third cell. We
choose a discount rate of 3.5 percent because this is generally viewed as the appropriate social
time preference rate of discount, and we feel that the social time preference method (as opposed
to the social opportunity cost method) is appropriate for the question of welfare.26 We focus on
the estimate based on the cohort data because this is more conservative. Since USD 1, 649 exceeds
the average bonus cost per school of USD 597, it follows that there is a welfare gain from attaching
bonus payments to local monitoring reports even before we consider the value of information.27
With the quality of information estimated to be higher under Info & Bonus than Info, we therefore
conclude that it is welfare-enhancing to pay for locally monitored teacher attendance.
It is also of interest to consider whether moving from Info to Info & Bonus is fiscally sustainable,
in the sense that the NPV of the additional tax revenue per school from the increased lifetime
25Even though we assume constant returns to education, the estimated gain is not simply a proportional increase
in the NPV. This is because the lifetime evolution of wages and expected remaining working years varies depending
on when a student drops out of school. Note further that the proportional increase is far smaller (between 1 and 2
percent) than the return to wage earnings. This is because few in our sample have access to formal employment.
26For a discussion of alternative discount rates, see Appendix B.2.
27Although there are differences across cells in Table 10, the internal rates of return (computed putting no value
on gains in the quality of information) are similar (3.80 percent for the admin data and 3.74 percent for the cohort
data), and both exceed the STP rate of discount.
19
formal sector earnings exceeds the bonus cost per school.28 The final two rows of Table 10 report
the average per-school NPV tax gain for eight scenarios, based on the two datasets used to calculate
enrollment gains, two discount rates, and two tax evasion rates. Our preferred estimate is USD
501, shown in the final cell. As discussed in Appendix B.3, we choose the higher discount rate
of 5 percent to reflect the cost of government borrowing in the Ugandan context, and feel that
this social opportunity cost consideration is appropriate for the question of fiscal sustainability.
We focus on the cohort data and the higher rate of tax evasion because this is more conservative.
Since USD 501 falls short of the average bonus cost per school by USD 96, we must also place
a financial value on the higher quality of information. To do so, recall from Table 4 Column
(5) that our estimate of the impact on the quality of information was −0.07. For P4LMP to be
fiscally sustainable, the minimum value the government must place on making a correct prediction
is therefore USD 96/0.07 ≈ USD 1, 371 per school or, since schools are open 180 days per year,
just under USD 8 per school day. The Government of Uganda has stated that it aims to spend
no more than UShs 150,000 (or roughly USD 56) per school inspection (Ministry of Education,
Science, Technology and Sports 2014).29 If we take USD 56 as the Government’s true (per school
day) valuation of information, then it follows that P4LMP is also fiscally sustainable.
Although our focus in this paper is on the welfare and fiscal consequences of paying for locally
monitored performance—i.e. layering bonus payments on top of an existing monitoring system—
it is of interest to consider the overall cost of implementation. Factoring in phone purchases,
registration of handsets, phone charging and airtime, two-day field visits by World Vision staff, and
a contract with Makerere University School of Computing and Informatics Technology, our estimate
of the cost of implementation is USD 533 per study school.30 The total cost of P4LMP, including
both implementation of the mobile monitoring system and payment of bonuses, is therefore USD
597 + 533 = 1, 130 per school. Since this is lower than our preferred, conservative estimate of the
average NPV earnings gain per school, it follows that introducing and paying for locally monitored
performance also passes a welfare cost-benefit test. This point becomes even more evident when
considering long-run costs of implementation at scale: the steady-state cost of a nationwide scheme
is an order of magnitude lower at just USD 56 per school.31
28Details of the underlying tax calculation are provided in Appendix B.3.
29It is questionable whether this target has actually been met. A 2008 audit documenting the frequency of inspec-
tions and the overall inspection budget suggests a cost closer to USD 190 per visit (Ministry of Education, Science,
Technology and Sports 2010).
30During the field visits, World Vision staff introduced the program, delivered the phones, and trained head teachers.
The contract with Makerere University was for platform development and ongoing technical support.
31This estimate is based on the following assumptions: 10 percent of phones are replaced every year; a quarter
of schools receive two-day field visits every year; and the same annual contract remains in place with Makerere
University. Note that, here, we amortize platform development costs over schools but not over time. This approach
is conservative but seems reasonable, since continued platform development and maintenance will be required to keep
pace with technology and changes in school staffing.
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5 Discussion
There are two headline results in Section 3:
1. P4LMP improves teacher attendance but local monitoring alone does not—there is a positive
and significant treatment effect on teacher attendance in the Info & Bonus arm, but not in
the Info or Control arms;
2. P4LMP improves the quality of information available to district-level administrators relative
to local monitoring alone: there are significantly fewer instances of unreported absence, and
no more instances of absence falsely reported as presence, in the Info & Bonus arm compared
to the Info arm.
Below we sketch a simple theoretical framework, set out more fully in Appendix B, that aids the
interpretation of these results.32
5.1 Theoretical Framework
The economy consists of a teacher (he), a head teacher (she), and a government bureaucracy (it).
Pupils play no active role. In all arms, the teacher chooses whether to attend school at cost CT .
Attendance is valued as εH by the head teacher. In the Control arm, the head teacher plays no
active role. In both treatment arms, the head teacher chooses whether to monitor at cost CH ,
and then whether to submit a truthful report to the bureaucracy. If reported absent, the teacher
incurs a cost, which we can think of as ‘shame’ δ. In the Info & Bonus arm, the bureaucracy pays
the teacher a cash bonus of β if reported present by the head teacher. The costs CT and CH
are observed by the head teacher and teacher but not by the bureaucracy. Realizations of these
random variables are assumed to be drawn independently from uniform distributions, with lower
and upper supports denoted by lower and upper bars respectively. The bonus β is the only source
of transferable utility. All players are risk neutral. Payoffs are stated formally in the Appendix.
Figure 4 represents the predictions from theory graphically.
Teacher attendance The dark blue regions in Figure 4 Panel (a) plot realizations of the moni-
toring and attendance costs where the teacher chooses to attend school. The intuition is straightfor-
ward. The area below the x−axis represents the baseline probability of attendance in the Control
arm: the teacher attends because he receives an intrinsic benefit from doing so. Teacher attendance
is predicted to be higher in the Info arm (larger dark blue area) because the head teacher is able
to leverage the reputation cost δ to secure the benefit εH . If δ exceeds the attendance cost and
εH outweighs the monitoring cost, then the players reach an equilibrium where the head teacher
commits to monitor and report truthfully, and the teacher then attends.
32This theory was developed before the field experiment to guide the design of a contemporaneous “multiple
monitors” treatment that is reported in a companion paper. We do not emphasize testing of the model in the current
paper, and simply use it to offer an intuitive interpretation of our results.
21
Teacher attendance is higher still in the Info & Bonus arm because there is now transferable
utility on the table, in the form of the bonus β. The head teacher can either use this transferable
utility to induce the teacher to attend, or she can collude and file a false report. If the attendance
cost is intermediate (higher than δ but less than εH) and β and εH together exceed the combined
attendance and monitoring costs (a joint efficiency requirement), the head teacher opts for the
former outcome. The players reach an equilibrium where they first agree on a side contract that
commits the head teacher to monitor and report truthfully and the teacher to share some fraction
of the bonus; the teacher subsequently attends.
Quality of information The shaded regions in Figure 4 Panel (b) plot realizations of the mon-
itoring and attendance costs where the bureaucracy would incorrectly predict the teacher to be
present when in fact he is absent. The area above the x−axis represents the baseline probability
of an incorrect prediction in the Control arm: the bureaucracy does not receive a monitoring re-
port and so, applying Bayes’ rule, concludes the teacher is present. The quality of information is
predicted to be higher in the Info arm than in the Control arm (the smaller, light blue area) for
two reasons. First, there is a region (to the left of the y−axis and above δ) where the head teacher
willingly sends a truthful report that the teacher is absent. Second, there is small region (below δ
and to the left of εH) where the head teacher’s truthful reporting induces the teacher to be present,
which again ensures the bureaucracy no longer makes an incorrect prediction.
Turning to the Info & Bonus arm, the received wisdom is that attaching financial incentives to
local monitoring reports will lower the quality of information. Our theoretical framework shows
that this need not be the case. For the parameter values in Figure 4 Panel (b), the area where
the bureaucracy would make an incorrect prediction is actually smaller in the Info & Bonus arm
than in the Info arm. To see why, compare regions A and B. In region A, the bonus β is additional
transferable utility that enables the head teacher to both cover her monitoring costs and induce the
teacher to attend. Without this transferable utility, there is no report and the teacher is absent,
leading to an incorrect prediction in the Info arm. The flipside is that in region B, when it is too
costly to ‘pay’ the teacher to attend but the head teacher is nonetheless intrinsically motivated
to monitor, the bonus gives her an incentive to submit a false rather than truthful report. This
lack of truth-telling results in an incorrect prediction in the Info & Bonus arm. Since region A is
bigger than region B, we therefore have an example illustrating that attaching incentives to local
monitoring can improve the quality of information.
5.2 Interpretation of Empirical Results
The framework above provides an explanation for our finding that P4LMP improved teacher at-
tendance, but monitoring alone did not. A meaningful, transferable source of utility is necessary
to enable local parties to reach a bargain that maximizes joint surplus; only then will a teacher
internalize the welfare gains from his/her attendance as well as the costs. There may be shame
attached to being reported absent but, in our experiment, it appears not to have been great enough
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(or transferable enough) to induce a significant improvement in teacher attendance. The same logic
can also explain our second finding that P4LMP improved the quality of information compared to
monitoring alone. Contrary to common intuition, ‘collusion’ is not the only relevant factor; the
extensive margin of reporting also matters and is higher under P4LMP. True, information quality
suffers due to absences falsely reported as presence (the dark red bar in Figure 3) but unreported
absences (the light blue bar) are lower under P4LMP, and this is the dominant effect.
It is also worth commenting on what the theory cannot explain. Our framework does not
predict absence falsely reported as presence in the Info arm. Empirically, however, we observed
this outcome on 7 percent of teacher days with independent spot checks—nearly as often as in
the Info & Bonus arm. These head teachers must have expected some other adverse consequence
(rather than loss of bonus) to follow from a truthful report of absence. Our framework also fails to
predict presence falsely reported as absence. This outcome was rare, occurring on just 3 percent of
teacher-days with independent spot-checks in the Info arm, and 5 percent of such days in the Info &
Bonus arm. Rationalizing this outcome as equilibrium behavior is harder and calls for a radically
different model—something that we do not undertake given our suspicion, noted in Section 3.1
above, that this is due to measurement error.
6 Conclusion
Received wisdom has it that pay for locally monitored performance (P4LMP) will fail to incentivize
desired behavior and will bias information for planning purposes. Simple bargaining logic, however,
suggests the reverse: P4LMP could both incentivize desired behavior and improve decision making.
Responding to these observations, this paper set out to answer three related questions. Can
P4LMP induce improvements in service providers’ behavior? Does P4LMP reduce or improve the
quality of reported information for planning purposes? And what is the overall welfare and fiscal
impact of P4LMP? To answer them, we used data collected during a field experiment in Ugan-
dan primary schools to estimate impacts on teacher attendance, student enrollment and learning
outcomes, and the quality of information available to district-level school administrators. We then
combined our experimental estimates with additional administrative data and the Uganda Na-
tional Panel Survey to undertake a welfare and fiscal analysis of alternative intervention designs.
The key takeaways are that P4LMP can improve service providers’ behavior—in our case, teacher
attendance—as well as the quality of information for planning purposes. This dual objective can
be met sufficiently cheaply to pass a welfare cost-benefit test. What is more, attaching financial
incentives to local monitoring reports is fiscally sustainable; taken together, the tax revenue from
increased lifetime earnings and savings from better information more than compensate for the cost
of making bonus payments.
A natural question is whether the P4LMP model evaluated in this paper should be rolled out
at scale. It seems clear that the high rates of teacher absenteeism observed in Uganda are at least
partly due to the system’s failure of to provide appropriate resources and incentives for monitoring.
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Districts have formal responsibility for monitoring schools but are typically under-staffed with a
limited transportation budget and so find it difficult to undertake regular inspections. Across
Uganda there are 87 schools per inspector and so, at most, an inspector can visit each school twice
a year,33 although in practice they see schools far less frequently.34 Since previous research has
shown that more monitoring is associated with lower teacher absence (Muralidharan, Das, Holla &
Mohpal 2017), one policy response would be for the government to transfer additional resources to
districts in the hope that this will translate into more school inspections. The available evidence
for Uganda, however, indicates that this may not work: the number of inspectors has more than
quadrupled since 2008 with no evidence of an improvement in teacher attendance.35
Our results suggest a cheaper, and arguably more incentive compatible, alternative to district-
led school inspections that makes use of cheap, readily scalable digital technology. Local monitoring
and reporting by mobile phone is inexpensive to set up, simply requiring the creation of a monitoring
template and central database, and costs little to run as there are no transport costs or salaries
to pay to inspectors. Rather than greater investment in traditional monitoring by district officials,
the main policy response suggested by this paper is further decentralization with a scaling up of
local monitoring and incentives to exploit one of the so-called “digital dividends” discussed in the
2016 World Development Report.36
Looking beyond the education context, there are many settings where public sector organizations
do (or could) rely on reports by local monitors that are costly to verify. It is therefore of interest to
ask whether P4LMP will generally prove as cost effective as it has in Ugandan primary education.
Drawing on a simple theoretical model, we have argued that failures in public service delivery
can be interpreted as a breakdown in bargaining. Seen in this light, the question of transaction
costs becomes paramount (Dixit 1996). Our theoretical results suggest that service delivery can
be improved via P4LMP in settings where (i) local monitoring costs are low relative to central
government; (ii) the local monitor shares, at least to some small degree, the preferences of the
beneficiaries; and (iii) there is a lack of transferable utility between the local monitor and agent
that prohibited bargaining in the first place. When all three conditions hold, P4LMP will put
transferable money on the table and could improve service delivery precisely because of (not despite)
the role played by side payments.
33In 2016 there were 281 inspectors and 24,419 schools, each open for 36 weeks per year.
34Monitoring failures are not unique to Uganda. In India, for example, “poor state capacities in terms of inadequate
resources and systemic infirmities contribute significantly to ineffective monitoring” (Bhatty & Saraf 2016).
35In 2008, there were 68 inspectors, compared to 281 in 2016 (Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and
Sports 2010). Chaudhury et al (2006) estimate an absence rate of 27 percent for 2006, compared to our estimate
of 26 percent in 2012 and the World Bank’s Service Delivery Indicators estimate of 27 percent in 2013 (Wane &
Martin 2013).
36Since our theory predicts that the welfare gain from P4LMP is increasing in the strength of the headteacher’s
preference for teacher attendance (εH in the model), complimentary policy efforts to recruit and retain pro-socially
motivated headteachers could also prove important.
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Table 2: Teacher attendance and student enrollment
Attendance Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Info 0.0039 0.0082 -23.52 0.0469
(0.04) (0.04) (24.83) (0.06)
Info&Bonus 0.0903∗∗ 0.0924∗∗ 46.50∗ 0.1383∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (26.21) (0.05)
Strata indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline control No Yes Yes No
Obs 3363 3363 85 1140
R-squared 0.039 0.044 0.896 0.046
Control mean 0.665 0.665 556.3 0.344
Info mean 0.671 0.671 493.7 0.396
Info&Bonus mean 0.762 0.762 587.5 0.485
Info=Info&Bonus: p value 0.084 0.076 0.016 0.190
Note: The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is teacher atten-
dance measured in our independent spot-checks. Column (1) reports
regression results on post-treatment data only, while Column (2) con-
trols for baseline teacher attendance. The dependent variable in Col-
umn (3) is total student enrollment measured at school-level in our
endline survey. We control for baseline student enrollment using our
baseline survey data. The dependent variable in Column (4) is a binary
indicator of enrollment at follow-up for a sample of pupils tracked from
the pre-intervention period. The final row reports p-values for a test of
the equality of the Info and Info & Bonus treatment arms. Standard
errors are in parentheses and, except for the school-level regression in
Column (3), are clustered at the school level. When standard errors are
clustered, p-values are estimated using the wild bootstrap resampling
method. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5%
level and * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3: Lee bounds on student learning outcomes
Info & Bonus vs Control Info & Bonus vs Info Info vs Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Literacy Numeracy Literacy Numeracy Literacy Numeracy
Lower -7.519∗∗∗ -5.860∗∗∗ -3.890 -4.424 -4.607∗ -2.623
(2.02) (1.67) (2.89) (2.83) (2.70) (2.19)
Upper 9.637∗∗∗ 9.499∗∗∗ 8.936∗∗∗ 6.875∗∗ 0.436 1.982
(3.09) (2.91) (3.15) (2.89) (2.50) (2.14)
Total Obs 860 860 620 620 800 800
Selected Obs 282 282 224 224 236 236
Ratio 0.288 0.288 0.199 0.199 0.111 0.111
Note: Each column reports a separate regression of pupil-level learning on treatment
assignment using the Lee Bounds estimator for the tracked cohort of pupils. The odd-
numbered columns report results from literacy tests and the even-numbered columns re-
port results from numeracy tests. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** is significant at
the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level.
Table 4: Quality of information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Report Absent, Present, Unreported Any of
submitted rep. present rep. absent absence (2)-(4)
Info&Bonus 0.1780∗∗ 0.0006 0.0209 -0.0883∗∗∗ -0.0668∗
(0.07) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Strata indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.186 0.014 0.034 0.073 0.024
Obs 1854 1854 1854 1854 1854
Info mean 0.582 0.076 0.028 0.158 0.262
Info&Bonus mean 0.743 0.073 0.049 0.076 0.198
Note: The data are based on all independent spot-checks of teacher attendance,
matched with local monitoring reports that were submitted for the same teacher on
the same day. Each observation is for a different teacher-day. The binary dependent
variables are coded to 1 if: (1) a local monitoring report was submitted; (2) the teacher
was absent and a report was submitted indicating he/she was present; (3) the teacher
was present and a report was submitted indicating he/she was absent; (4) the teacher
was absent and no report was submitted; and (5) any of events (2) to (4) occurred.
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. P-values are es-
timated using the cluster wild bootstrap resampling method. *** is significant at the
1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level.
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Note: The data are based on a sample ex-
panded from Table 4 to include all days
on which a report could have been submit-
ted during the intervention. The depen-
dent variable indicates whether at least one
monitoring report was submitted on a given
day for a given school or not. Standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered at
the school level; p-values are estimated us-
ing the cluster wild bootstrap resampling
method. ** is significant at the 5% level.
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Table 6: Testing for Hawthorne effects on teacher attendance
Period 2 Periods 2 and 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Info -0.0324 -0.0486 -0.0378 0.0411
(0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.13)
Info&Bonus 0.0619 0.0191 0.0836∗ 0.125
(0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.11)
No. spotchecks in period 1 0.0309 0.0528
(0.05) (0.04)
Info x no. spotchecks in period 1 0.007 -0.0407
(0.07) (0.06)
Info&Bonus x no. spotchecks in period 1 0.0292 -0.0174
(0.07) (0.06)
Strata indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Obs 1273 1273 1924 1924
Info=Info&Bonus: p value 0.080 0.687 0.012 0.521
Note: The data are based on a sub-sample from Table 2, excluding the first term
of intervention. The dependent variable in all columns is teacher attendance. Col-
umn (1) reports results for the specification in Table 2 based on equation (2) using
data from the second term only. Column (2) includes the number of spot-checks
during the first term (1, 2 or 3 visits per school) and the interaction between this
variable and treatment status. Columns (3) and (4) repeat this exercise for the
pooled sample of the second and third terms. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses and clustered at the school level; p-values are estimated using the cluster wild
bootstrap resampling method. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant
at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7: Testing for Hawthorne effects on reporting behavior
(1) (2)
Submited report Reported presence
Info&Bonus 0.115∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Spotcheck day -0.0538 0.0273
(0.04) (0.04)
Info&Bonus x spotcheck day 0.0706 0.000784
(0.05) (0.05)
Strata indicators Yes Yes
Date fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1350 13624
Note: The data are based on a sample expanded from Table 4 to in-
clude all days on which a report could have been submitted during the
period when we were conducting spot-checks. Column (1) reports data
at the school-day level, for every day during the spot-check period. The
dependent variable indicates whether at least one monitoring report was
submitted on a given day for a given school or not. Column (2) reports
data at the teacher-day level. Here, the dependent variable indicates
whether the teacher was reported present on that day or not. Standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level; p-values are
calculated using the cluster wild bootstrap resampling method. *** is
significant at the 1% level, and ** is significant at the 5% level.
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Table 8: Schematic of welfare comparison and fiscal sustainability
Step Inputs Output
1. Attainment impacts
1. Reduced-form enrollment impacts (administrative and
cohort data)
Averted dropouts
Repetition rates (administrative and cohort data)
2. NPV earnings impacts
2.a. Earnings data in wage sector (UNHS) NPV 0s
Earnings data in agric sector (UNHS)
Probability of wage employment (UNHS)
2.b. NPV 0s (Step 2a) NPV
1
s
Causal return to schooling (Duflo 2001)
2.c. Averted dropouts (Step 1) Impacts on NPV lifetime earnings
NPV 0s , NPV
1
s (Step 2a, 2b)
3. Fiscal sustainability
3.a. PAYE 2014 Tax compliance rate for wage employees
Wage employees 2014 (WDI)
3.b. Averted dropouts (Step 1) NPV tax revenue
NPV 0s , NPV
1
s (Step 2)
Tax compliance rate (Step 3a)
Note: UNHS refers to Uganda National Panel Survey 2011/12 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2012); WDI 2014 refers
to World Development Indicators for Uganda (World Bank 2017). As defined in Section 4.2, NPV 0s and NPV
1
s refer
to the series of potential net present values of expected earnings—without and with an additional year of schooling
causally induced by P4LMP, respectively—for students indexed by the grade s ∈ {1, . . . , 6} in which they would have
left school in the absence of P4LMP. PAYE 2014 refers to the number of wage employees found in the Pay As You
Earn tax filings for 2014, as held by the Uganda Revenue Authority; and WDI refers to the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators dataset, which reports the number of wage employees in Uganda for the year 2014 (World
Bank 2017).
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Table 9: Calculating the average difference between per school Info and Info & Bonus in the gain
in NPV of future lifetime earnings due to treatment
Administrative Data Cohort Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Grade NPV Gain Averted Dropouts Total Gain Averted Dropouts Total gain
1 6, 602.69 −11.59 14.02 −162.50 12.56 −145.58
2 6, 733.43 4.18 7.09 29.62 9.76 40.77
3 6, 878.53 20.31 5.86 118.98 10.62 215.74
4 7, 038.55 36.77 27.64 1, 016.44 10.80 397.16
5 7, 214.03 53.50 12.31 658.57 10.44 558.53
6 7, 405.44 70.42 7.12 501.19 8.27 582.38
Totals 2, 162.30 1, 649.00
Note: This table gives the underlying calculations for one set of parameter assumptions, and the two
data sets, reported in Table 6. Column (2) shows the NPV of future lifetime earnings, given each
grade attainment, assuming a discount rate of 3.5 percent. Column (3) shows the gain in NPV due
to an additional year of schooling achieved, assuming a causal impact of 6.8 percent and 1 percent
respectively on wage earnings and probability of formal employment. Columns (4) and (6) indicate
treatment effects—the average number of averted dropouts per grade per school due to the program—
calculated using the two different data sets. Columns (5) and (7) show the average financial gain per
grade per school. The figures of USD 2,162 and USD 1,649 are reported in the first and third cells in
the first row in Table 11.
Table 10: Gain per school gain in NPV of future lifetime earnings, and tax revenue, from Info & Bonus
relative to Info treatment
Administrative Data Cohort Data
3.5% 5% 3.5% 5%
NPV lifetime earnings 2, 162.30 −4, 372.20 1, 649.00 −3, 806.43
NPV tax revenue, no evasion 5, 552.01 3, 721.56 4, 630.37 3, 105.51
NPV tax revenue, 16.12% compliance 894.98 599.91 746.42 500.61
Note: All cells assume a causal effect of one additional year of schooling on the probability of formal
sector employment (formal sector wage earnings) of 1 percent (respectively 6.8 percent). The first row
reports the average gain per-school in NPV of future lifetime earnings moving from the Info to the
Info & Bonus treatment, using either the administrative data or cohort data to estimate enrollment
gains, and assuming either a discount rate of 3.5 percent or 5 percent. Our preferred estimate is USD
1,649, which exceeds the average per-school bonus cost of USD 597. The internal rates of return for
the administrative and cohort data are 3.80 percent and 3.74 respectively. The final two rows report
the average per-school gain in tax revenue, based on the earnings gain in the first row, and assuming
either a 100 or 16.12 percent tax compliance rate. Our preferred estimate is USD 500.61, which is less
than the average per-school bonus cost. Hence, moving from Info to Info & Bonus is fiscally sustain-
able only if the financial value attached to improved information is sufficiently high. The internal rate
of return for NPV tax revenue with 16.12 percent compliance is 5.02 percent using the administrative
data and 4.33 percent using the cohort data.
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Figure 1: Teacher attendance
(a) All terms
(b) By term of exposure
Note: The figure is based on 3,363 teacher-days with independent spot-checks.
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Figure 2: Average enrollment at endline, by grade
Note: The figure plots the average number of pupils enrolled per grade in Info and Info & Bonus
schools, as reported in the endline survey conducted in November 2013.
Figure 3: Quality of information
Note: The figure is based on 3,363 teacher-days with independent spot-checks. The overall height of
the bar shows the rate at which a (Bayesian) district-level school administrator (the ‘bureaucracy’ in
our theoretical framework) would make an incorrect prediction of teacher attendance, given local mon-
itoring. It follows that the quality of information is highest in the Info & Bonus arm and lowest in the
Control arm.
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Red shading = 
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(b) Quality of information
Note: Panel (a): the dark blue shaded regions show realizations of the monitoring cost, CH , and at-
tendance cost, CT , for which the teacher chooses to attend school. Panel (b): the shaded regions show
realizations of the monitoring and attendance costs where the bureaucracy would incorrectly predict
the teacher to be present when infact he is absent, due either to no report (light blue) or a false re-
port (red). In both panels, remaining parameters are held fixed at εH = 8, δ = 3, and β = 10. For
these parameter values, region A is bigger than region B, indicating that there are fewer cost realisa-
tions resulting in an incorrect prediction (i.e. higher quality of information) in the Info & Bonus arm
compared to the Info arm.
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Appendix A Additional Figures
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Figure A.1: Distribution of teacher salaries
Note: The figure shows the distribution of monthly salaries for 629 teachers (excluding headteachers
and their deputies). We only collected data on teacher salaries at endline, so the sample is restricted to
teachers who remained in the sample schools for the whole duration of the program. Six observations,
where reported salaries are 10 times larger or 10 times smaller than the median salary, are excluded
since they are likely to be measurement errors.
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Figure A.2: Implementation of bonus scheme
(a) Distribution of total bonus payouts
(b) Distribution of days chosen for bonus payment
Note: Panel (a) shows the distribution of cumulative bonus payments for the sample of 316 teachers
who were in the Info & Bonus treatment arm at the beginning of the study. The red line indicates
the average payment received; the blue bar indicates the maximum possible payout. Panel (b) shows
the probability that different days of the week were chosen as the qualifying report for bonus payouts,
excluding the first month of program implementation. Within this 26 week period, Wednesday was




We consider three variants, which we refer to as experimental arms. The basic structure in all
arms is that teachers can choose between showing up for work or not. In the Control arm, teacher
attendance remains unmonitored. Having pinned down a baseline, we then study how the intro-
duction of local monitoring by the head teacher, who reports to a government bureaucracy, affects
teacher attendance. We refer to this as the Info arm. Next, we investigate how combining local
monitoring with financial incentives triggered by the head teacher’s reporting affects teacher at-
tendance, referring to this as the Info & Bonus arm. We compare equilibrium outcomes—teacher
attendance, head teacher monitoring/reporting, and the bureaucracy’s equilibrium beliefs—across
the three experimental arms.
Players and actions The economy consists of a teacher (he), a head teacher (she), and a gov-
ernment bureaucracy (it). In all arms, the teacher chooses whether to attend school, a ∈ {0, 1}. In
the Control arm, the head teacher plays no active role. In both treatment arms, the head teacher
chooses whether to monitor m ∈ {0, 1}. If the head teacher monitors, m = 1, she observes a and
chooses a public report r ∈ {0, 1}. We will say that the head teacher sends a truthful report iff
r = a. If the head teacher does not monitor, m = 0, she cannot send a report.37 In the Info
& Bonus treatment arm, the bureaucracy pays a cash bonus β directly to the teacher iff he is
reported present, r = 1. The bureaucracy takes no further action under any arm, other than to
form a posterior belief over teacher presence.38
Payoffs All players are risk neutral. Net of any side transfers, payoffs to the teacher and head
teacher are:
UT = 1{m=1,r=1} · β − 1{a=1} · CT − 1{r=0} · δ
UH = 1{a=1} · εH − 1{m=1} · CH .
If the teacher attends school, a = 1, he incurs a (possibly negative) cost of CT . If the teacher
attends, the head teacher receives a private benefit of εH . If the head teacher monitors, she incurs
a (possibly negative) cost of CH . Reporting entails no further cost for the head teacher but a mark
of absent, r = 0, imposes a reputational cost of δ on the teacher. If the head teacher is indifferent,
we assume that she reports truthfully.
37This assumption reflects the experimental design feature that mobile phones must be kept that the school.
38In forming this belief, the bureaucracy uses only its knowledge of the support of CT together with equilibrium
strategies. Clearly, this is a simplification as mid-tier bureaucrats may have other sources of information. Since
the availability of such information should be orthogonal to treatment, we do not model it here. In our empirical
analysis, the level of incorrect predictions when the bureaucracy receives no report (light blue bars in Figure 5) would
be biased upwards, but the difference between the two treatment arms (Table 4) should be not be affected.
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Key assumptions The costs CT and CH are observed by the head teacher and teacher but not
by any other player. For convenience, we assume that realizations are drawn independently from
uniform distributions. The lower and upper support of the distribution of CT are denoted by CT
and C
T
. To calibrate the model to the baseline absenteeism rate, we assume −CT > CT > 0 (so
that attendance in Control schools is more than 50 percent). The lower and upper support of the
distribution of CH are denoted similarly, although here we simply assume C
H
> 0 > CH . Again
for convenience and in the spirit of rationalizing baseline absenteeism, we assume that the bonus
β is the only source of transferable utility.39 Relatedly, we assume that side contracts sharing β
are costless and enforceable, and that the head teacher can commit to monitor. Finally, we assume
that parameters satisfy β > εH > δ > 0.
Timing To emphasize the differences across arms, it is worth spelling out the order of play. The
timing in the Control arm is:
0. Nature draws a realization of CT and reveals this cost to the teacher.
1. The teacher chooses whether to attend school, a ∈ {0, 1}. Payoffs are realized and the game
ends.
The timing in the Info arm is:
0. The bureaucracy announces the monitoring scheme. Nature draws realizations of CT and CH
and reveals both of these costs to the teacher and the head-teacher.
1. The head teacher chooses whether to make an announcement to the teacher. An announce-
ment R(a) commits the head teacher to monitor, m = 1, and specifies the report r that the
head teacher will send to all players following each possible action a.
2. The teacher chooses whether to attend school, a ∈ {0, 1}.
3. If the head teacher made the announcement at Stage 1, she monitors and sends the public
report r = R(a). Otherwise, the head teacher takes no action. Payoffs are realized and the
game ends.
The timing in the Info & Bonus arm is:
0. The bureaucracy announces the monitoring and incentive scheme. Nature draws realizations
of CT and CH and reveals both of these costs to the teacher and the head teacher.
1. The head teacher chooses whether to make a side contract offer to the teacher. A side contract
< R(a), τ > commits the head teacher to monitor, specifies the report r that the head teacher
will send to all players following the action a and specifies the side transfer τ that the teacher
will pay to the head teacher in the event that r = 1.
39If all sources of utility were transferable, then the players should reach a jointly efficient outcome. The high rates
of absenteeism reported above suggest this is not the case. In reality, δ might be partly transferable. We assume
non-transferability to make the distinction between the Info and Info & Bonus arms as clear as possible.
44
If the side contract is accepted at Stage 1, the game continues as follows.
2. The teacher chooses whether to attend school, a ∈ {0, 1}.
3. The head teacher monitors and sends the public report r = R(a). If r = 1, the bureaucracy
pays β to the teacher who then transfers τ to the head teacher. Payoffs are realized and the
game ends.
If the side contract is not accepted at Stage 1, the game proceeds as in the Info arm except that at
Stage 3 the bureaucracy transfers β to the teacher in the event that r = 1.
Appendix B.2 Analysis
We now state equilibrium teacher attendance and the bureaucracy’s equilibrium beliefs in the three
experimental arms in turn.
Control The probability of teacher attendance is





Anticipating the teacher’s strategy, the bureaucracy deduces that the probability of teacher atten-
dance is
Pr[a = 1|m = 0] = Pr[m = 0, a = 1]
Pr[m = 0]





and therefore predicts that the teacher is present. This prediction is incorrect in the event of an
unreported absence, that is





Info The probability of teacher attendance is










The probability of monitoring and reporting of teacher attendance is










and the probability of monitoring and reporting of teacher absence is







In contrast to the Control arm, the bureaucracy now reaches three information sets. The first is
m = 0. Anticipating the teacher and head teacher’s strategies, the bureaucracy deduces that the
probability of teacher attendance is

















and so, at the information set m = 0, predicts that the teacher is present. This prediction is
incorrect in the event of an unreported absence, that is












The second information set is r = 1. Since the bureaucracy knows that the head teacher reports
truthfully, it predicts that the teacher is present. The third information set is r = 0. Again aware
that the head teacher reports truthfully, the bureaucracy predicts that the teacher is absent. Both
of these predictions are correct.
Info & Bonus The probability of teacher attendance is










The probability of monitoring and reporting of teacher attendance is










and the probability of monitoring and reporting of teacher absence is zero. The bureaucracy now
reaches just two information sets. The first is m = 0. Anticipating teacher and head teacher
strategies, the bureaucracy deduces that the probability of teacher attendance is


















and so, at the information set m = 0, predicts that the teacher is present. This prediction is
incorrect in the event of an unreported absence, that is
Pr[m = 0, a = 0|Bonus] = Pr[CT > 0]















The second information set is m = 1, r = 1. Anticipating teacher and monitor strategies (in
particular that the head teacher may now send a false report), the bureaucracy deduces that the
probability of teacher attendance is
Pr[a = 1|m = 1, r = 1] = Pr[m = 1, r = 1, a = 1]
Pr[m = 1, r = 1]
= Pr[C
T≤εH ,CH≤β]+Pr[β<CH<εH+β−CT ]









and so, at the information set m = 1, r = 1, predicts that the teacher is present. This prediction is
incorrect in the event of an absence falsely reported as presence, that is







Summing up Teacher attendance is highest in the Info & Bonus arm and lowest in the Control
arm (follows from a comparison of (8), (10), and (12)). Quality of information (i.e. the probability
that the bureaucracy makes an incorrect prediction) is highest in the Control arm but there is an
ambiguous comparison between the two treatment arms (following from a comparison of (9), (11),
and (13)+(14)). In particular, the probability of an unreported absence is lower, but the probability
of absence falsely reported as presence is higher, in the Info & Bonus arm relative to the Info arm.
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Appendix C Detailed Welfare Analysis
This section outlines the calculations and assumptions underlying the welfare analysis presented in
Section 4. We proceed in three stages. First, in Section C.1 we use two different data sources—
administrative data on enrollment and repetition, and a tracked cohort of pupils surveyed before
and after the program—to obtain a conservative estimate of the increase in grade attainment in Info
& Bonus schools relative to Info schools. Second, in Section C.2 we use prior studies and additional
data sources to calculate the increase in NPV of future lifetime earnings caused by an increase in
grade attainment. Third, in Section C.3 we combine this model with estimates of tax evasion among
wage earners derived from Uganda Revenue Authority and the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators to project the fiscal consequences of payment for locally monitored performance.
Appendix C.1 Moving from Enrollment to Grade Attainment
To what extent can we attribute the higher enrollment observed in Info & Bonus schools to higher
grade attainment? Modelling grade attainment requires assumptions relating to: (i) persistence of
the program and (ii) persistence of the program’s impacts on attainment. In both cases we take
the most conservative approach. On the first point, we model the welfare comparison for the actual
experiment as it was conducted; i.e. a policy intervention for one year, with a return to the status
quo and an end to project expenditures immediately thereafter. On the second point, we assume
that grade attainment remains the same for all pupils, except for those who would have dropped out
were it not for the program (the averted dropouts) and, furthermore, that these averted dropouts
go on to drop out immediately after withdrawal of the treatment and so only gain one more year
of education.40 These conservative assumptions, again, allow us to estimate the lower bound for
welfare analysis.
Estimating averted dropouts: Administrative data Our two data sources allow for two
different strategies, each with different identifying assumptions on transfers. First, using our survey
data and combining it with administrative data on repetition figures in 2011 and 2012, we can back
out the implied number of dropouts in grade g and year t, ∆g,t.
Enrollment in grade g at period t can be decomposed into the following end-states
πg,t ≡ ∆g,t + ρg,t + τg,t + λg,t,
where ∆g,t denotes the number of pupils who dropout at the end of the year, ρg,t the number
who repeat the grade, τg,t the number who transition to the next grade, and λg,t the number who
transfer out to another school. Similarly, enrollment in grade g + 1 at the beginning of year t + 1
can be decomposed as
πg+1,t+1 ≡ τg,t + ρg+1,t + ϕg,t,
40It is plausible that the expected future attainment of these pupils is lower than the average pupil because they
were at the margin of dropping out.
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where τg,t denotes the number of pupils who have progressed from the previous grade, ρg+1,t the
number who are repeating the grade, and ϕg,t the number who have transferred in from another
school. Substituting in for τg,t, we have
∆g,t ≡ (πg,t − ρg,t)− (πg+1,t+1 − ρg+1,t)− µg,t
where we define net outbound transfers as µg,t ≡ (λg,t − ϕg,t). We have access to administrative
data on enrollment and repetition numbers per grade per school, but do not have data on inbound
or outbound transfers and can therefore only estimate
∆̂g,t = (πg,t − πg+1,t+1)− (ρg,t − ρg+1,t) . (15)
For the difference in ∆̂g,t across treatment arms to provide a true estimate of the impact of the
program, we need to assume that net transfers are on average the same across these arms. There
is a risk of over-estimating the impact on averted dropouts, for example, if more pupils transfer to
the Info & Bonus schools because of the program.
Figure C.3 shows the difference in dropouts between Info & Bonus and Info for each grade,
estimated using (15). Note that this difference is highest in Grade 4, precisely the grade after
which there is a large drop in enrollment (Figure 2 in the main body of the paper). On average 70
more pupils dropped out from Info schools relative to Info & Bonus schools and this difference is
statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.41
Estimating averted dropouts: Cohort data As a second strategy we can derive implied
annual dropout and repetition rates from the differences in reduced-form dropout and repetition
probabilities observed for the sample tracked from 2010, when the P3 pupils were first observed
as part of a separate study, to 2013, when they were observed post-intervention.42 Data are also
available on the grade in which these pupils were enrolled (if any). To back out annual dropout
and enrollment probabilities, we make note of the fact that three academic years were completed
between the time this sample of pupils was drawn to our endline survey, but that only one of these
years was spent under treatment.
Let δw denote the probability of dropout under treatment regime w, and recall from Table 2
that in the Control arm the fraction of the tracked cohort observed to still be enrolled at endline was
0.344. The probability of dropout in the Control arm can therefore be written as Pr[Dropout|w =
Control] = 1− (1−δControl)3 ≈ 1−0.344. Using the balance implied by the experimental design, we
can generate observed probabilities of dropout with one period of treatment exposure in either of
the treatment arms w ∈ {Info, Info&Bonus}. The implied annualized dropout rates for these arms
are given by setting the corresponding observed dropout probability in treatment arm w equal to
41Results from the regression analysis estimated using equation (1) are available upon request. In these regressions,
the number of observations drops from 85 to 82, because the repetition number in 2012 is missing for three schools.
42Data on enrollment for this sub-sample of pupils are not available for the 2012 baseline to the present study.
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Figure C.3: Difference in dropouts between Info and Info & Bonus schools, by grade
Note: The figure shows the difference in the average number of dropouts between Info and Info &
Bonus schools, by grade, where dropouts have been calculated based on equation (15) using our survey
data on enrollment and administrative data on repetition. We refer to these differences as the ‘averted
dropouts’.
Table C.1: Estimated annual pupil transition probabilities, by treatment
Treatment, w Dropout, δ̂w Repetition
Control 0.299 0.044
Info 0.143 0.060
Info & Bonus 0.012 0.063
δControl+(1−δControl)δControl+(1−δControl)2δw. The resulting implied annual transition probabilities
are given in Table C.1. Relative to the estimates of Table 2, dropout rates are lower since these
represent annual rather than cumulative probabilities. Moreover, differences across treatment arms
are exaggerated, since (by virtue of the random assignment of treatment) in expectation all observed
differences are attributable to the one year under treatment.
Note that the two different methods discussed above make use of two different identifying
assumptions for estimating the true difference in dropouts. The decomposition using administrative
data on enrollment and repetition requires that net transfers are not different between treatment
arms. On the other hand, to derive dropout rates using the tracked sample, we need to assume
that outbound transfers are not affected by the interventions.
These reduced-form experimental results estimate the short-term enrollment and dropout im-
pacts of assignment to alternative treatment regimes, providing evidence of a statistically and
economically significant impact of the Info & Bonus arm relative to the Control and Info arms.
With our conservative approach, we assume that each averted dropout amounts to no more than
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one additional year of grade attainment. But what is the financial impact for those students who
remain in school for one more year? We turn to this below.
Appendix C.2 Moving from Grade Attainment to Earnings
As a final step in the welfare analysis, we place a financial value on the increase in grade attainment.
We begin by describing the model that we use to measure the net school-level NPV gain associated
with moving from Info to Info & Bonus. We then set out how we choose the numbers required to
calculate this net NPV gain, drawing on prior studies and additional data sources.
Earnings NPV Model For simplicity, we assume that there are only two sectors (formal wage
employment and subsistence agriculture), and further that earnings from agriculture do not depend
on years of education and experience. We also assume that all pupils start school aged 7, do not
repeat a grade, obtain no more than Grade 7, and leave formal employment aged 60.43 Given these









(Ps,t · ws,t + (1− Ps,t) ·A) , (16)
where Ps,t is the probability that this individual with s years of schooling is employed in the formal
wage sector at age t, ws,t is the associated formal wage, A is the (constant) subsistence agricultural
wage, and r is a discount rate. For each grade s = 1, ..., 7, we want to obtain potential NPVs: one
that reflects expected lifetime earnings of those who exit school at that grade in control schools,
and a (counterfactual) outcome arising if individuals who would otherwise depart after grade s of
schooling are induced by the treatment to obtain an additional year of schooling. To illustrate,
consider s = 1. Lifetime earnings for those leaving school at grade s in control schools, denoted by
superscript 0, can be written as:











+ · · ·+






The year after dropping out the individual is 8 years old. With probability P1,8 she enters the
formal wage employment sector and earns w1,8. With probability (1− P1,8) she earns A. Her
probability of formal wage employment and the associated formal wage then evolve each year with
her accumulated experience until she retires aged 60. Similarly, the outcome for such a student
43The data do not allow us to determine the age at which someone completed a grade. So we need to assume
that everyone starts school aged 7 and progresses through grades at the same rate in order to determine how many
working years they have available after graduation. Earnings are assumed to be zero after age 60. Because future
earnings beyond that age are heavily discounted in the NPV, this assumption has little effect on our results.
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induced by treatment to obtain an extra year of schooling, denoted by superscript 1, can be written
as











+ · · ·+






where π and ρ denote the causal effects of one additional year of schooling to the probability
of formal employment and the formal sector wage respectively. At age 8, the individual is still
in school and earns nothing. The year after dropping out she is 9 years-old. With probability
(P1,8 + π) she enters the formal wage employment sector and earns (1 + ρ)w1,8. With probability
(1− P1,8 − π) she earns A. Her probability of formal wage employment and the associated formal
wage then evolve each year with her accumulated experience until she retires aged 60. Staying in
school for one additional year therefore delays her earnings by one year but uplifts her expected
earnings in all future years. The difference between NPV 11 and NPV
0
1 is the grade 1-specific net
NPV gain associated with moving from Info to Info & Bonus. Depending on parameters, this may
be positive or negative. Our goal is to estimate this net NPV gain for each of grades s = 1, ..., 6.44
To do so, we need numbers for the rates, r, π, and ρ, the series Ps,t and ws,t, and the constant A.
Choice of parameters The standard discount rate used in social cost benefit analysis is 3.5
percent and is justified via the social time preference (STP) method of discounting (HM Treasury
2011). A nominal discount rate of 10 percent has been used in the development literature by
authors appealing to the social opportunity cost (SOC) method of discounting and, in particular,
the high cost of government borrowing in low-income contexts (e.g. Ozier (2011), and Baird, Hicks,
Kremer & Miguel (2016)).45 We view the STP method, and hence r = 3.5%, to be appropriate for
our welfare comparison. Few studies in developing countries have looked directly at the impact of
education on the probability of gaining employment in the formal wage sector. As a conservative
lower bound we use a figure of π = .01. This is consistent with our own estimate from observational
data (see Table C.2 below). We use ρ = 6.8% for the causal impact of education on earnings since
this represents the conservative end of recent studies using plausibly exogenous variation to identify
the causal impact of education on earnings in developing countries.46
44Because we do not observe children’s schooling outcomes after they leave primary school, we are unable to measure
impacts on the probability of completing Grade 8. Conservatively, we set the attainment impact for those who would
complete Grade 7 in the absence of our study to zero, implying that our welfare estimates do not depend on NPV 07 .
45The cross-sectional Mincerian earnings functions on which our estimates are built are in real terms. Inflation
over the period 2010–2015 has averaged 8.6 percent in Uganda (IMF 2017); combining this with a nominal discount
rate of 10 percent implies a real discount rate even lower than 3.5 percent. In addition to our preferred estimates, we
also present estimates for a real discount rate of 5 percent as a point of comparison.
46Duflo (2001) uses a difference-in-difference approach based on year of enrollment and distance from newly con-
structed schools to estimate a return to education ranging between 6.8 and 10.6 percent for Indonesia. Other
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Using the 2011/12 Ugandan National Panel Survey data, we estimate the expected probability,
Ps,t, of formal sector employment for someone aged t currently residing in one of the six districts
where our study took place, and who dropped out after completing grade s:47
Ps,t = α0 + α1e+ α2e
2 + α3e
3 + α4s+ εs,t, (19)
where s is years of schooling and e = t − s − 7 is the number of years of experience. Using the
same data, we also estimate the observational lifetime evolution of wages, ws,t, using the standard
Mincer earnings function (and further restricting the sample to individuals who have obtained at
most Grade 7 and are 60 or under):
lnws,t = β0 + β1e+ β2e
2 + β3s+ εs,t. (20)
Table C.2 shows the results of these two regressions.
Finally, to estimate A, we take the average annual agricultural income from the sample of rural
households whose main source of income is agriculture and divide this by two. This figure of USD
228 is plausibly an over-estimate of the individual earnings from agriculture (and thus leads to
a more conservative estimate of the impact of the program), because more than two people per
household typically work on the household’s farm. Another approach would be to divide by the
number of household members who claim to have worked on the household farm in the past year
(roughly 4).48
Appendix C.3 Fiscal Sustainability
Tax NPV Model Making the reasonable assumption that earnings from subsistence agriculture
are untaxed, the NPV of the government’s tax revenue collected from the lifetime formal sector








Ps,t · (1− ε) (τ · (ws,t − w̄) + τ0) , (21)
where τ is the marginal rate of income tax applied to incomes above threshold w̄, τ0 is the total tax
on incomes below w̄ (as discussed below, all wage earners in our sample have incomes between the
first and second thresholds of the tax schedule), ε is the rate of tax evasion, and other parameters
well-identified studies that use samples from developing countries (e.g. Card 2001) typically find larger returns to
education. Montenegro and Patrinos (2014) use observational wage and schooling data to calculate a returns to
education of 15.9 per cent in Uganda, compared to 12.4 in sub-Saharan Africa.
47We adopt a linear probability model specification for ease of calculating the marginal impact of an additional year
of education, or experience on the probability of being employed. Nonetheless, the predicted probability of formal
employment always remains between zero and one at all grades and experience levels.
48We note that it is plausible that productivity in the non-formal sector also improves with education, but to our
knowledge there are no studies in a developing country context that credibly estimate this. Furthermore, in our
sample, experience and education are not significantly correlated with household earnings from subsistence farming.
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Table C.2: Predicting the probability of formal sector employ-
ment and wages
(1) (2)
Prob. employed Log wage
Years of schooling 0.00817∗∗∗ 0.0487∗∗
(0.00) (0.02)
Years of experience 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0538∗∗
(0.00) (0.02)
Years of experience - squared -0.000426∗∗∗ -0.000826∗
(0.00) (0.00)





Note: Columns (1) and (2) report regression results from equa-
tions (20) and (19) respectively. In both regressions, the sample
is restricted to individuals who have obtained at most Grade 7,
are no longer in school, and under 60. In Column (2) the sample
is further restricted to individuals who earn a salary. Standard
errors are in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is
significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level.
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are defined as above. We are interested in two sets of NPVs: grade-specific outcomes with s
years of schooling, NPV 0s (tax), and grade-specific outcomes with an additional year of schooling,
NPV 1s (tax). Both are defined in a manner analogous to the earnings NPVs above. Again, our goal
is to calculate the difference between NPV 1s (tax) and NPV
0
s (tax) for each grade, and the sum of
this net gain over grades s = 1, ..., 6.
Choice of parameters We use the same parameters as in the earnings NPV model, with the
exception of the discount rate r. Since the cost of government borrowing is central to the question
of fiscal sustainability, we view the SOC method to be appropriate. Previous authors such as Ozier
(2011) and Baird et al. (2016) have used a figure of 10 percent, appealing to the high nominal cost
of government funds. In our context, the cross-sectional earnings function from which we derive our
estimates represents a real return. With inflation routinely running at 5 to 6 percent in Uganda,
we opt instead for r = 5%. To obtain an estimate for the rate of tax evasion, we combine World
Bank estimates (World Bank 2017) of 2.959 million wage and salaried employees in Uganda in 2014
with PAYE microdata from the Uganda Revenue Authority for the same year, in which an average
of 477,118 employees pay tax in each month. This gives us a figure of ε = 83.88%. To calculate the
tax take we apply the current PAYE schedule in Uganda. For wage earners with earnings over UShs
410,000 as distributed in our sample, this tax liability (in UShs) is 25000 + 0.3 · (ws,t − 410000).49
49In this and in all other calculations, we use an exchange rate of 2648 UShs to 1 USD.
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